Eddie Beaver

"The Ayatollah Begs To Differ": Have the recent events in Iran rendered much of the insight and analysis in Hooman Maid's journey through Iranian society and political arena? After a second cursory follow through from a first read in May, I don’t think that is the case. Maid has a pedigree and appearance that seems to have helped open more doors for him than the typical writer about Iran has available, while retaining an affinity with the lower classes and wealthy alike. He's the grandson of an ayatollah and has the beard of a religious man, though he has close ties to former President and reformer Mohammad Khatami. He is remarkably evenhanded in his approach towards Ahmadinejad, which is beneficial because it fosters a pragmatic appraisal of one of the more important faces of the new Iranian junta post 6/12. Scattered throughout his peeks into Iranian society are a few fascinating points and arguments worth sharing: - Ahmadinejad engages in Holocaust denials as a means to humiliate the Europeans by forcing them to admit to their barbarism (“How could such a great civilization do such a thing? Surely you’re not monsters?)and acknowledge their fathers were mass murderers, reminding Iranians and Arabs alike of who the real monsters in history have been. (43) - After the Shah’s fall, the typical urban gangs were co-opted by clerical backed paramilitary committees (Komiteh). (25) - The providing of free education to the children of Basiji establishes a powerful relationship between the regime and its violent legions. (29) Also, programs to populate the universities with the poor, the deeply religious and the underprivileged are changing the character of the educated classes (114). - The more literal interpretation of Shia mythology observed in deeply religious families is a new concept in Iranian history and culture. (85) - The hardliners introduced into government by Ahmadinejad since 2005 will likely be a fixture long after he has left the scene. (103) - The question of rights, fundamental to Shia Islam, is explosive in the sense that attempts to deprive Iranians of them (besides alleged token few like clothing choices) can backfire on the regime in power. (118) - “… the most moderate, and even the most liberal reformist clerics are united in their firm belief that the revolution was pure, that Khomeini's views on a political system were sound, and that any democracy in Iran will always be an Islamic one.” (158) - (Before 6/12), The Abu Ghraib scandal, CIA rendition cases, and the Guantanamo detention facility gave Iran, but also its prisoners, an unexpected boost in the years after 9/11 in that Iran, in order to show its moral superiority, continually trumpets the treatment of its prisoners as comparing most favorably to those in American hands. (184) - Khatami's failure was to not promote a single successor. (195) - Shias have long been taught to not provoke their enemies, who in olden days were the Sunni majority surrounding them.... Shia concerns with avoiding conflict that could mean the annihilation of the minority sect(233). - Iranians are often adroitly reminded by their leaders that when their soon to be deposed prime minister Mossadeq nationalized the Iranian oil industry, in effect demanding their right to the profits from their own oil, the British responded publicly, and at the UN no less, that Iran's exercise of its right was a "threat to the security of the world," words that have been repeated by the US in response to Iran exercising its right, haq, as far as Iranians are concerned, to produce nuclear fuel. (235) - US attempt to pinpoint Iranian machinations behind insurgency foiled by (a) little proof being offered to back up claims and (b) unexploded bombs and shells were displayed with markings, in a perfect English lacking even on unfortunate Iranian road signs (c) dates of manufacture stenciled onto the bombs were not only in English but in the American form (that is month, day, year) rather than in the Iranian (and rest of the world's) standard format. (236) All points being debatable, Maid nevertheless leaves the reader with food for thought given potential US approaches towards Iran post 6/12 and how internal events might proceed. The loss of legitimacy by the Ayatollah and the Revolutionary Guard junta that seems to have co-opted other elements into a seizure of power may yet have dramatic negative consequences if the narrative of the reformers begins to appeal to a wider section of society that feels for religious, nationalist and business reasons the regime can no longer enjoy their support. A multi-pronged message will need to be crafted (as it appears is the case) with a patient investment in resources to begin to sour the population on the regime much as Ayatollah Khomeni sapped the strength of the Shah over more than a year. The book has one notable weakness that should not deflect the reader from at least considering a library check-out: - it lacks much insight (or giving a voice to) regarding Iranian women, who by most available measures in the post 6/12 world seem to be playing a much greater role in events than previously considered

Post 6/12, this is still a good read on Iranian society and politics. B+

Imagining India in 2047 is much easier now thanks to Ian MacDonald, whose River Of Gods is a stellar sci-fi adventure set in a future subcontinent which has devolved into independent regions and cities.

Nearly a dozen characters are at the heart of the story, a tale of the emergence of banned "Generation 3" Artificial Intelligence (A.I. passing the Turing test), societal unrest and a looming water war after several years of failed monsoons. The characters are richly complex, from an Afghan journalist raised as a refugee in Sweden who is the pawn of an ambitious Hindi fundamentalist leader to an adviser to the Bharati Prime Minster with a politically lethal attraction to "nutes", surgically altered human gender neutrals. The rousing conclusion, "Ensemble", where stories intersect and destinies met, makes for reading that is nearly impossible to put down until the tale is finished.

Ahmed Rashid explores what has happened since 9/11 with Afghanistan and Pakistan in Descent Into Chaos. As Rashid is not known as a causal optimist or alarmist, the strong sense of disappointment in his writing when addressing American efforts, given the lack of focus placed on Afghanistan for years and the ghosts of "what might have been" speaks volumes for what has gone wrong. His insights about the views Afghans held of Americans in contrast to their opinions of Pakistanis, Russians, Iranians and other neighbors fuel that discussion of mistakes but also of latent opportunities. Writing about his native Pakistan, he makes a compelling case for the continuing lack of American comprehension of Pakistani politics (the USG has and even now apparently continues to be trusting but not verifying the Pakistani military, not to mention the ISI). To understand what options the US has to pursue to rectify this, reading Rashid's latest is the first step proceeding that realization something has gone terribly wrong here. - The military operates increasingly amid hubris, it views Afghanistan's subservience to Pakistan as a priority, something even Afghan Pashtuns are unlikely to accept. - It is enraged about America's nuclear deal with India and views it as the highest form of hypocrisy that sells out Pakistan's interests after all the sacrifices Pakistan has made for America since 9/11 and before. - The growth of "Pakistani" Taliban (noted with fascinating detail and insight in the local culture of the "Big Man" and homegrown militias and commercial ventures) and the opportunistic fusion of them with local rural and urban groups as well as transnational groups like Al-Qaeda is real and dangerous. - Well-educated Pakistanis in the urban groups are a force in devising more complex and efficient operations, from more effective suicide attacks on police and infrastructure to assassinations of key figures like former PM Bhutto. - The military has been shafting the civilian leadership since Musharraf's cascading mistakes led to their revival. It unilaterally decided to pull out of the tribal areas and cease the fight there, while leaving behind militias and tribesmen for the government and the Americans to try to train. - The civilians have little understanding of what they've gotten into (such as the "multi-layered terrorist cake" in the frontier areas) because they don't receive the level of intelligence and political support from within the government that is necessary to act on the threats amidst them. - Afghanistan is increasingly a regional war and much larger in scope a problem than previously, drawing in Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia. More insight from Rashid... NYT profile of Rashid "A Regional War"

Lately I have read a number of books that have utterly challenged and changed some of my core assumptions and beliefs about terrorism and the future of the struggle to defeat those who would use it to harm us (The Suicide Of Reason, Terror And Consent, Leaderless Jihad and several others).  A particular passage from Lee Harris in "The Suicide Of Reason" stunned me:

"What makes the Spanish uprising of 1808 so instructive for our purposes is that it is virtually impossible for anyone in the West to take sides in that conflict. If we choose to support the aspiration of the Spanish people to free themselves from the yoke of Napoleon, we must also be prepared to accept that they sought this liberation in order to bring back one of the most loathsome and vile tyrants..., Ferdinand VII.... as well as that epitome of fanatical intolerance, the Spanish Inquisition. And who today among liberals or conservatives is prepared to take the side of these sinister forces? But the same question can be asked about the other side. On both ends of the political spectrum in the West today, elimination of absolute tyrants and fanatical grand inquisitors can only appear to us to be a positive step forward. Yet who among us would be comfortable forcing a people to accept such progress at the point of a gun?..... then who are we to compel them, by brute force, to abandon their illiberal reactionary ethos in order to adopt our liberal progressive values?"

The book is a challenging meditation on reason vs. fanaticism, the danger of radical Islam, the wisdom of our assumptions about human nature and society and the nature of Western community, sacrifice and faith in this war.   Passages like the above inspire deep thought in this reader.. specifically of present or future similarities.   Would a Saudi Arabia engaged in civil war share some of the same characteristics? Wouldn't the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990's count as such?  Rashid's "Taliban" makes clear that The Northern Alliance was a slight step above the Taliban in its commitment to human rights, good governance and justice.   

In his new book, "The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift Of Global Power To The East", Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's former UN ambassador and now Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at Singapore National University, sees the world as becoming a better place, driven by the massive growth of the Asian low to middle classes amid their historic journey into modernity. Throughout the book he sprinkles illuminating personal examples from his time as a diplomat, whether testifying to the arrogance of the EU from the fall of the Soviet Union until now or the appalling lack of adaptation to new global realities on the part of American elites. Needless to say, he pulls no punches in the book, as further posts will indicate. "The Three Scenarios" He challenges the Western (in his view consisting of the EU & the Anglo nations) loss of confidence, bemoaning how countries that touted free trade and open markets can now become skeptical of the very process they created while making self-serving exceptions on wasteful agricultural subsidies and nationalist appeals to protect specific industries and companies from foreign competition. His larger point is a serious paradox our politicians and elites often ignore: "...up until recently the most optimistic societies of the world have been Western societies, but they seem to be losing their optimism, at a point in time when they should be celebrating the galloping modernization of the world." Such misplaced fear and focus on dangers, not opportunities, have harmed many already, causing countless matters of great potential to be ignored or squandered because of irrational behavior and thinking. Moving on, he explores three potential outcomes of Asia's rise in the 21st Century by order of probability: March To Modernity Asia continues its growth and development, offering competing but complimentary examples to other regions amid an "enormous renaissance of Asian societies" and civilizations. Billions of responsible stakeholders join the West with common interests of stability. The world shifts from a seemingly monocivilizational world into a Retreat Into Fortresses The West (primarily the EU, already engaging in such behavior unabashedly) lapses into protectionist policies feeling they cannot and should not compete with the Asian economies. The current trade talks are sabotaged and left to fail by European dishonesty and intransigence and the triumphant influence of the Lou Dobbs and John Edwards types in America who signify an American loss of confidence in the global trade system. "This growing inflexibility of Europe to accommodate change would well be replicated in the United States if Americans begin to share the same degree of insecurity as Europeans." Western Triumphalism As this is the least likely of the scenarios, Mahbubani points out three main flaws of the idea that the world will or could be Westernized to the extent assumed by many in the West: 1. Belief that the West had triumphed over the Soviet Union because of its values. 2. Belief that any society anywhere in the world could be immediately transformed overnight into a liberal democracy. 3. Belief that differences in culture did not matter because Western liberal democratic society was universally applicable. Its of little surprise to the reader that Mahbubani warily observes the continued obsession of many in the West with the ascension of the last scenario. He takes care to observe how the West nevertheless is a valid inspiration on great issues; as he declares; "It is a huge sign of the new cultural confidence of many Asian societies, especially China and India, that they are prepared to learn from and absorb Western best practices in developing their societies."  Part II: The 7 Pillars Of Success Asia has learned from the West and wondering why the West is not celebrating Asia's rise.

While a refreshing, reasonable examination of the changes of warfare throughout the past few centuries, John Mueller’s "The Remnants Of War" could certainly bear to be longer with more detail and elaboration.  The author, a professor @ Ohio State University, is a no-frills skeptic on a litany of issues that made his work a valuable contribution to my understanding of what really happened in Bosnia, Rwanda and other conflict zones in recent history.  Mueller elaborates early and often on “criminal warfare”, which involves combatants who are induced to wreak violence primarily for the fun and material profit they derive from the experience.   Throughout history, the intersection of crime, conflict and the granddaddy of them all, war, has been a regular occurrence.  Non-state actors have seemingly always caused trouble on the frontiers of empires, while rampant corruption, greed and incessant power struggles seem to have been a stable of most living spaces where a strong, central figure has been missing.  The grisly history of Europe testifies to this well, with infamous figures like the Englishman John Hawkwood in 14^th Century Italy and members of other such “companies of adventure”, idle young men with little of value in life and a determination to correct that deficiency.  A key question is how much different these brigands are compared to today’s hell-raising gang members, ethnic militias (just another type of gang usually) and listless youth who join or are impressed into rebel armies and insurgencies? Answering this question, Mueller takes his shot exploding myths that have been propagated by the media and governments at great detriment to a serious reckoning with the why’s, how’s and what’s of conflicts around the world. Prominent on his hogwash menu is the proposition that  “ethnic tensions” share central blame for the tragedies that unfolded in the Balkans, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and elsewhere.  Complex reality passes by convenient simplicity and thrashes it in its wake. Why, for example, would the majority ethnic Serb Yugoslavian Army effectively disintegrate in the face of mass desertions and mutiny early in the hostilities, when Serbs were winning their greatest victories in Croatia and Bosnia?  What happened to ethnic pride among the rank and file?  If, as Mueller notes, “after years of supposedly influential media propaganda and centuries of supposedly pent-up ethnic and civilizational antagonism”, these soldiers responded by “declining to embrace it” in the form of the aforementioned as well as determined draft dodging, what really motivated the despicable war crimes that defined the Balkans in the 90’s? Ethnicity thus is “important in all this as order, organizational, sorting or predictive device or principle, not as a crucial motivating factor.” Here the dynamic of criminal warfare is what’s really at the heart of the matter.  Genocide in Rwanda? How can it be construed as ethnic hatreds run amok ala “neighbor against neighbor” when statistically only around 10% of the Hutu population participated in the killing and most just passed their time in hiding? What’s more notable is the genesis of the interahamwe in soccer fan clubs, “recruiting jobless young men who were wasting in idleness and its attendant resentments.”  Author Phillip Gourevitch described “drunken militia bands fortified with assorted drugs from ransacked pharmacies were bused from massacre to massacre.”   Balkan hatreds?  A Bosnian militia that defended Sarajevo during the 1992 siege had to be put down by Bosnian forces a year later because of their prevalence for crime and exploitation of the citizenry.  Milosevic released thousands of criminals from prison and recruited other known criminals as a de facto mercenary force.    “The key dynamic of the violence, however, was not in exploding hatreds or in the rising of neighbor against neighbor; still less the clashing of civilizations.  Rather it is in the focused predation of comparatively small groups of violent thugs and criminals recruited and semi coordinated by politicians.” This could be a near accurate description of any number of ongoing conflicts; from Colombia to East Timor, even Iraq.  Mueller’s “Four Stages” of war and ethnic cleansing could seemingly be used with useful results to begin to understand violence in Iraq and elsewhere where ethnic and religious hatreds erupt into conflict.  Takeover. Here the only groups ready and willing to use force quickly take control, usually after some notable degree of planning and conspiracy with sponsors like politicians, the military or business interests.  The implied threat of violence alone often suffices to force members of the wrong groups (political, ethnic, religious, social) to flee.  Carnival. An orgy of looting and destruction typically would occur after the seizing of control.  Into this storm of depravation, ordinary citizens “might opportunistically join in the violence, sometimes to settle older grudges.” Revenge.  Some among the victimized might take up arms or seek other ways to avenge their losses.  A cycle of violence is thus easily created, and within a generation a sense of historical grievance is nursed often by rival readings of history that accentuate divisive moments at the expense of long periods of relative tolerance, cooperation and peace. Occupation and desertion. Like parasites, the group in control has largely squeezed out every last opportunity for benefit and power, and now feuds amongst itself.  Now even the home team, the powerless members of the same group, are valid prey for extortion, robbery and even murder.

A serious challenge for anyone writing about the ongoing enslavement of millions of human beings is how to express the action for emancipation message without falling into the obvious traps of off-putting the reader with the twin vices of excessive moralizing and representing the problem as an unrelenting tragedy. Kevin Bales, director of Free The Slaves, managed to overcome that challenge and write a richly informative and compelling book about the "new slavery", "Disposable People: New Slavery In The Global Economy. Describing his personal experiences in journeys to witness and study why slavery thrives in India, Brazil, Thailand, Mauritania and elsewhere around the world, Bales also offers astute economic, social and political commentary that elucidates the unique characteristics supporting the evolution or emergence of slavery in each locality, while not failing to note the common traits inherent in most forms of the new slavery. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The new slavery focuses on big profits and cheap lives; where "people become completely disposable tools for making money." A key aspect of the new slavery is the changing nature of ownership. While slavery is feasibly illegal everywhere in the world, nowadays "people buy slaves and don't ask for a receipt or ownership papers; but they do gain control- and they use violence to maintain this control." Unrestrained greed evolves in the global economy; "indeed, for the slaveholders, not having legal ownership is an improvement because they get total control without any responsibility for what they own." Bales is careful to use conservative estimates and descriptions throughout the book, halving the guesstimates of some activists and positing that there about 27 million slaves in the world now, mostly in South Asia under the guise of bonded labor. Its spread throughout the world, from sweatshop workers in California to enslaved domestic workers in Hong Kong. The final products resulting from the practice can be found in most homes and dwellings worldwide as he notes, "large international corporations, acting through subsidiaries in the developing world, take advantage of slave labor to improve their bottom line and increase the dividends to their shareholders." Race has little to do with slavery nowadays, instead, the "criteria of enslavement today do not concern color, tribe or religion; they focus on weakness, gullibility and deprivation." The two factors Bales believes are critical to the shift from old slavery to the "exploitive greed of the new" is the "dramatic increase in world population following WW2", which has collapsed already overburdened social, health and education systems in much of the developing world, leading to fewer and fewer opportunities for people to succeed in local or globalized economies and skyrocketing unemployment that causes the growing population to signify a massive supply "of potential slaves and drove down their price." Bales describes the grim outcome as "without work and with increasing fear as resources diminish, people become desperate and life becomes cheap." The other critical factor is the "rapid social and economic changes" that have unfolded hand in hand with modernization. Populations and societies in flux offer a prime pool of cheap resources to be exploited. Other highlights from Bales' examination of how and why slavery is thriving: Corrupt governance, especially in the guise of the local police who are often in cahoots with slaveholders, guarantees a low-risk environment within which slavery thrives. Accepted labor conventions and laws are used to "legitimate and conceal slavery. Much modern slavery is hidden behind a mask of fraudulent labor contracts..." which serve two key purposes for slaveholders; entrapment and concealment. "The new disposability of (slaves) has dramatically increased the amount of profit to be made from a slave, decreased the length of time a person would normally be enslaved, and made the question of legal ownership less important." In essence, slaves are used until they are no longer useful (whether because the job is done or the environs maximized, i..e. making charcoal in Brazil, planting seasonal fields in Nepal), no longer usable (sex slaves in Thailand with AIDS, famished and dying charcoal workers in Brazil) or no longer profitable (sick slaves of almost any kind anywhere).

Amid enormous growth and capable leadership, China's re-emergence as a great power after centuries of discord has raised hopes and fears across Asia and around the world. It has judiciously marshaled its resources and capabilities to achieve its goals and advance its interests. Yet there are obvious shortcomings and limits to what China can achieve, ranging from the brevity of the free ride it is enjoying within the international system and the eventual eruption of populist outrage in many a country China is doing business in. Joshua Kurlantzick achieves a rare balance in writing "China's Charm Offensive" in that he portrays multiple viewpoints of China's rise and use of soft power, from negative connotations related to key Chinese mercantile policies to promising aspects of Chinese aid and investment that fills gaps in international development schemes like roads and bridges. He is clear about China's challenges in deploying its soft power, both in the short term and in the less certain out years. Its best to frame these challenges as questions, because the messy triangle of Chinese interests, local, national, and global public opinion (often influenced by the activities of NGO's and other advocacy groups) and American policies can inflame tenuous matters into worst-case scenarios or manage to seize opportunity from the clutches of disaster. No outcome is written in stone nor "bound" to happen. Could Chinese influence "prove disastrous in other countries- an obstacle overseas to environmental protection, to better labor policies, to corporate governance?.... ...could China essentially wind up exporting its own domestic weaknesses?" Certainly, China's abysmal record on all these matters draws real concern amid the potential for its effect on other developing nations. Kurlantizick tackles the issue by visiting the small Peruvian town of San Juan de Marcona, where lax safety standards and horrible working conditions at a Chinese owned mine led to constant strikes, local disillusionment with the Chinese and the importation of Chinese workers in response, thus setting up a classic exploitive relationship where China takes and takes, but offers little to nothing in return to the locals or even the nation. Such activities continue in Zambia and elsewhere, which breed seething anti-Chinese sentiment. Could China's aid policies hinder development and security? Kurlantzick relates recent events in Cambodia that are ominous for what current Chinese use of soft power (in the expanded definition of the term; their economic prowess and assets) could promise for the future. The following occurred when the World Bank threatened to suspend hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance to Cambodia because of its deteriorating human rights record and allegedly rampant corruption; "Five or ten years ago, Cambodia would have had to comply with the World Bank and the donor's demands. Not now... On a visit to Cambodia in April 2006 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promised Phnom Penh $600 million worth of loans and grants. Meanwhile, the World Bank did not cut Cambodia off, perhaps because it feared that it would then have no influence in the country." Similar events unfolded in Laos, Angola and elsewhere, as he describes throughout the book. Its not just the rogue regimes (North Korea, Sudan, Zimbabwe) that China backs, as this is obvious to everyone, but corrupt and greedy elites across the developing world, including nominal US allies in Thailand, the Philippines and Nigeria. Their misrule with Chinese support, if not adjusted by wiser Chinese policies that look beyond resource needs and open markets, could, indeed already has, generate a furious backlash against Chinese business and political interests in the countries. Could growing Chinese assertiveness ultimately alienate their neighbors and others while annulling much of their soft power? "China could further alienate other nations if it seems to be using multilateral institutions as a cover, without jettisoning Beijing's own more aggressive, even military aims. .... Any Chinese decision that appears arrogant or targeted towards Chinese domination of the region will cause a backlash." Kurlantzick takes care to mention often the importance of multilateral institutions in Asia, writing "if China drops its rhetoric of "win-win" relationships and makes more aggressive, unilateral demands, it could provoke a backlash in Asia, which is relying on multilateral institutions to refrain China from regional dominance." This represents an ample opportunity for the US to contribute a greater degree of stability to the region by taking regional multilateral institutions far more seriously. Will China's trade relations ultimately limit its soft power? "If China builds the kind of trade surpluses with the developing world that it enjoys with the United States, it could stoke local resentment. Eventually Beijing could wind up looking little different to people in Asia or Africa or Latin America than the old colonial powers, who mined and dug up their colonies, doing little to improve the capacity of the locals on the ground." Finding a way past mercantile policies will be China's challenge for the ensuing decades, rife with potential missteps that could derail Chinese goals. Kurlantzick identifies the prevailing tactic of its neighbors who play China off the US- and vice versa- in order to keep a prevailing balance. The limits of soft power here are notable because no matter how low it seems the US position or image in Asia may be, there will be ample opportunity for the US to rebound because of the static dynamic of regional relations.

Turkey Unveiled (In My Apartment On Monday nights and any other time I am not on duty or on the ship) Cultural Amnesia (on board the ship while I am on a lunch or dinner break, or preparing to go to sleep, I read an essay at a time) Japan Rising (on the 2 hour ferry ride to and fro Everett to Bremerton two-three times a week) The ship's summer deployment schedule continues to be held hostage to various issues, further delaying my plans for multi-week bloc reading learning and note-taking efforts on networks, Latin American history and pre-colonial Africa. Aggressive note-taking habits learned from ZenPundit and Chirol of Coming Anarchy allow me to better understand and experience real learning from the books I read, but do slow my normal speedy reading habit.  I am eternally grateful for the blogosphere which enhances my meager abilities and expands my limited understanding of the world and its enormous, awe-inspiring diversity of beliefs, ideas, traditions and challenges.

So how does China manage to woo developing nations (particularly its neighbors and "strategic" partners like Angola and Sudan)? Joshua Kurlantzick believes China now deploys more sophisticated tools of influence, which can be categorized as "tools of culture" and "tools of business". The "tools of business" are an exceptionally potent group of options and strategies that offer a variety of ways for China to fulfill its policy objectives of "negating fears of its rise, developing its poorer internal regions and asserting itself in areas where other major powers have lost influence or interest."

"China's tools of business, in fact, have become powerful enough that even when people like Harry Roque (a Filipino lawyer who tried to challenge a highly questionable Chinese railroad bid on waste and corruption grounds) raise concerns about Chinese aid and investment, their own governments sometimes shut them up."

China's economic growth allows it to overpower the objections of environmental, political and social activists in neighboring countries and elsewhere. Offering lucrative investment opportunities to Cambodian elites with which to enrich themselves so they will allow Chinese dam projects on the Mekong River is just one example of many in which Chinese interests can increasingly trump local concerns.

"China has ... tried to demonstrate that as it grows, it also will become a much larger consumer of other nations' goods, creating "win-win" economics, central to the idea of China's rising peacefully. ....Chinese officials often try to do so by providing trade and investment and tourism targets. These targets, for five or ten years in the future, tend to be enormous and to obscure the fact that, at present, Chinese direct investment into regions like SE Asia and Latin America still lags far behind investment from the US and other wealthy countries like Japan."

As the powerhouse in SE Asian economics, China may be able to lift millions of its neighbors out of poverty in the future if the Chinese market does substantially open up, a process that is far from happening yet, and a trend that causes China to place a premium on hyping "win-win" economics to potentially insecure neighboring publics who could conceivably hold their democratic leaders accountable.

"The Chinese government encourages firms to invest in strategic industries (petrol, natural gas and mining) and select countries. .... These national champions enjoy a range of benefits that will help them compete, including low-interest funding from Chinese banks.... ..because many Chinese companies gained experience in China, a developing nation itself, "their better understanding of emerging markets provides a stronger guarantee of success in their initial overseas expansion plans." In other words, with their background in China's often lawless business climate, Chinese companies have the experience to invest in Liberia or Cambodia or many other countries with little rule of law."

Here Thomas PM Barnett's hopes of the positive usage of Chinese policies and boots on the ground (not just military but the full spectrum of infrastructure builders, i.e. "Development-In-A-Box") in places like Liberia and Cambodia are not only believable but possible, if coordination between Chinese firms motivated by profit and opportunity and developing world aid groups and political groupings would occur. Unwillingness on the part of many "Old Core" (i.e. the West and Japan) businesses to invest too heavily in iffy climates can be offset by the experienced Chinese firms. On the other hand, if resource wars are the wave of the future, China is bringing its A game to the contest while most dawdle behind.

"China's diplomatic style of signing many agreements during foreign visits by its top leaders earns it considerable initial goodwill and positive media coverage. But often the agreements are merely letters of intent. In Latin America and Asia, when officials from local boards of trade and investment follow up, they sometimes find that Chinese officials had laid no groundwork to put these letters into practice."

As Kurlantzick points out, this could backfire on China in the future, but for now the beauty of low expectations enables China to enjoy "what Chinese scholars call the "maxi-mini" strategy, where Chinese aid attempts to get the maximum return from the minimum outlay" as in the 2004 tsunami relief effort where American aid in particular dwarfed Chinese contributions yet China enjoyed near equal coverage and appreciation from regional media and political power blocs. Chinese diplomacy, investment goals and policies all require it to use its tools of business as never before in order to woo China's often skeptical neighbors and potential new friends.  Building itself as as the friend of developing countries, unlike the human rights obsessed, tariff-hypocritical developed world powers, its tools of business play a serious role in successfully advancing Chinese interests.  While 100% coordination among businesses and Chinese migrants (who Kurlantizick identifies as playing a huge role in changing the nature of China's borders to become free-flowing exchanges of goods and services even in basket cases like Burma, Siberia and alongside North Korea.) as well as other actors is impossible, China still is managing its efforts with its authoritarian structure much easier and better than democratic rivals and neighbors. Next: China's challenges in deploying its soft power to meet its objectives and how the US fails to respond.